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Abstract
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size, andwe compare the optimal company size across diﬀerent managerial objectives.
Wedemonstrate the restrictiveness of common assumptions on eﬀort aggregation (e.g.,
constant elasticity of eﬀort substitution), andwe show that common intuition (e.g., that
corporate companies are more eﬃcient and therefore will be larger than equal-share
partnerships) might not hold in general.
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1 Introduction
Many human activities beneﬁt from collaboration. For instance, writing papers in Eco-
nomics with a coauthor is often much more eﬃcient and fun than writing them solo. But
it is very infrequent that an activity beneﬁts from the universal participation of the whole
human population—a moderate ﬁnite group suﬃces for almost every purpose. So what
determines the size of the productive company? When do the gains from cooperation
balance out the costs of overcrowding? Williamson (1971) writes:
The properties of the ﬁrm that commend internal organization as a market
substitute would appear to fall into three categories: incentives, controls, and
what may be referred to broadly as “inherent structural advantages.”
We concentrate on the inherent structural advantages of groups of diﬀerent sizes. We
study a model of collaborative production that demonstrates that the answer critically de-
pends on the properties of the production function in a very speciﬁcway. Ourmain contri-
bution is to summarize a generic but hard-to-use effort aggregation function that maps the
agents’ individual eﬀorts to the aggregated eﬀort spent on productionwith a simpler team-
work efficiency function that measures the comparative eﬃciency of a team of N workers
against one worker. We demonstrate that many tradeoﬀs arising from employing diﬀer-
ent managerial criteria can be characterized by the interplay of the production function,
which transforms aggregated eﬀort into output, and the teamwork eﬃciency function. For
instance, to determine what company size maximizes the eﬀort made by the company’s
employees, one needs to study the balance between the returns to teamwork eﬃciency and
the behavior of the marginal productivity of the total eﬀort.
We compare the predictions for two types of companies:
team: workers determine their eﬀort independently, and the product is split evenly; and
firm: the residual proﬁt claimant sets the eﬀort level with the optimal contract.
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We attempt to make as few assumptions as possible about the shape of production func-
tions, which pre-empts the chance to obtain closed-form solutions. However, we are able
to obtain comparative static results regarding the change in the optimal size of the ﬁrm
due to changes in the marginal costs of eﬀort, ownership structure (going from a worker-
owned to capitalist-owned ﬁrm and back), and managerial criteria (maximizing individ-
ual eﬀort versus maximizing surplus per worker). We demonstrate that the diﬀerence in
the sizes chosen by diﬀerent owners under diﬀerent managerial criteria are governed by
the direction of change in the elasticity of the production function, and therefore results
obtained under the assumption of constant elasticities are misleading. The premise that
elasticities are constant is natural in parametric estimation, but, as we show, assuming
constant elasticities rules out economically signiﬁcant behavior.
We assume away monitoring, transaction and management costs, direct and indirect,
to ensure that they do not drive our results. We believe they are an important part of the
reason why ﬁrms exist, but they are complementary to the forces we discuss, and their
eﬀects have been extensively studied. Our point is that even in the absence of these costs,
there may still be a reason for cooperation—and a reason to limit cooperation. Ignoring
most of the issues about incentives and controls allows us to obtain strong predictions,
providing an opportunity to test empirically for the comparative importance of incentives
in organizations1. Our framework allows one to make judgements about the direction of
change in the company’s size due to changes in the institutional organization based upon
the values of elasticities of certain functions, which can be estimated empirically. Hey-
wood and Jirjahn (2009) show that, in German data, the amount of proﬁt sharing in the
company is not perfectly related to the company size, whereas one would presume that
proﬁt sharing would be next to meaningless in a large enough company. Their literature
review contains similar studies, demonstrating both the positive and negative connection
of the company size and prevalence of the proﬁt-sharing in incentives in diﬀerent coun-
1See Bikard et al. (2013) as an example in teameﬃciency estimation. This paper also contains a vast review
of other empirical papers that estimate collaboration eﬀects, such as in writing comic books, Broadway
musicals and research papers.
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tries. This line of study is still active: one of the most recent studies, Long and Fang (2013)
show that in Canadian ﬁrms, an increase in the proportion of proﬁt-sharing in remuner-
ation is associated with increased eﬀorts, especially for industries with team-based pro-
duction. Other channels of possible explanation are investigated, too: Cornelissen et al.
(2014) shows that some of the heterogeneity can be explained by the reciprocity in par-
ticular industries. Our model, however, shows that one can reconcile the observed mixed
evidence without sophisticating the model.
We now review the relevant literature. In Section 2, we introduce the model and solve
for the eﬀort choice in both the team and the ﬁrm. In Section 3, we discuss how to identify
the optimal size of the company. The conclusion follows. The mathematical Appendix
contains proofs, elaborates on the characterization of the teamwork eﬃciency function,
and discusses the single-peakedness of our size-choice problems.
1.1 Literature Review
The paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The moral hazard in teams liter-
ature was introduced by Holmstrom (1982), who showed that the provision of eﬀort in
teams will be generally suboptimal due to externalities in eﬀort levels and the impossibil-
ity of monitoring individual eﬀorts perfectly. Legros and Matthews (1993) showed that
the problem of deviation from eﬃcient level eﬀort may be eﬀectively mitigated if the shar-
ing rules are well-designed.2 Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest peer pressure to mitigate
the 1/N eﬀect: the increase in the number of workers lowers the marginal payoﬀ from
higher eﬀort. When the ﬁrm gets larger, the output is divided between a larger quantity
of workers, while they bear the same individual costs. Hence, the eﬀort of each worker
should grow less as ﬁrms grow larger, and the peer pressure should compensate for this
decline.3
2Winter (2004) argues that, frequently, the uniform split of surplus is not necessarily a good outcome.
We keep treating workers equally for analytical tractability.
3In the same spirit of taking peers’ responses into account, Heywood and McGinty (2012) replace the
Nash equilibrium concept with the Consistent Conjectures approach: each agent, instead of assuming that
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Adams (2006) showed that the 1/N eﬀect may not occur if the eﬀorts of workers are
complementary enough. Because he uses a CES production function with constant re-
turns to scale, the determinant of suﬃcient complementarity is the value of the elasticity
of substitution. McGinty (2014) extends this argument to power production functions. In
this framework, two outcomes are generic: either to always increase, or always to reduce
the ﬁrm size. By generalizing, we obtain a nontrivial optimal company size.
This allows us to contribute to the ﬁrm size literature too. Theories of ﬁrm boundaries
are classiﬁed as technological, organizational and institutional (see Kumar et al. (1999)).
The technological theories explain the ﬁrm size by the productive inputs and the ways
in which the valuable output is produced. Basically, ﬁve technological factors are taken
into account in describing the ﬁrm size: market size, gains from specialization, manage-
ment control constraints, limited workers’ skills, and loss of coordination. For example,
Adam Smith deﬁned the ﬁrm size by beneﬁts from specialization limited by the market
size. By his logic, workers can specialize and invest in a narrower range of skills, hence
economizing on the costs of skills. Becker and Murphy (1992) focus on the tradeoﬀ be-
tween specialization and coordination costs. The larger the ﬁrm, the larger the costs of
management to put them together to produce the valuable output.
Williamson (1971), Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Rosen (1982) use loss of control to
explain the ﬁrm size. Williamson points out that the size of a hierarchical organization
may be limited by loss of control, assuming that the intentions of managers are not fully
transmitted downwards from layer to layer. Calvo and Wellisz (1978) show that the eﬀect
of the problem largely depends on the structure of monitoring. If the workers do not
know when the monitoring occurs, the loss of control doesn’t hinder the ﬁrm size, but it
may do so if the monitoring is scheduled. Rosen (1982) highlights the tradeoﬀ between
increasing returns to scale inmanagement and the loss of control. Because highly qualiﬁed
managers foster the productivity of their workers, ablemanagers should have larger ﬁrms.
However, the attention of managers is limited, hence having too many workers results in
other agents do not respond to agent’s deviation, believes that there is a (locally linear) best response. This
yields more eﬀort in outcomes when complementarities are high enough.
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loss of control and substantially reduces the productivity of their team. The optimal ﬁrm
size in this model is reached when the value produced by the new worker is less than the
losses due to attention being diverted from his teammates.
In this literature, Kremer (1993) is the paper closest to ours, because this is one paper
that obtains the optimal size of the ﬁrm based solely on the ﬁrm’s production function.
This paper focuses on the tradeoﬀ between specialization and the probability of failure
associated with low skill of workers. He assumes that the the value of output is directly
proportional to the number of tasks needed to produce it. A larger number of workers—
and hence tasks tackled—allows for the production of more valuable output, but each
additional worker is a source of the risk of spoiling the whole product. Hence, the size of
the ﬁrm is explained by the probability of failure by the workers, which correlates with
the worker’s skill.
Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) analyze a problem similar to ours. Agents pariticipate in
an aggregative game, where the payoﬀ of each agent is a function only of the agent himself
and of the aggregate of the actions of all agents, and they establish existence and compar-
ative statics results for games of this type. Nti (1997) oﬀers a similar analysis for contests.
We allow general interactions, but under certain assumptions we can summarize these in-
teractions in a similar way, which does not depend on additive separability. In addition,
Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) andNti (1997) study comparative statics for this general class
of games with respect to the number of players, whereas we go a step beyond, looking at
the optimal number of players from the perspectives of diﬀerent managerial objectives.
Jensen (2010) establishes the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in aggregative
games, but does not explore the symmetry of the equilibrium or the comparative statics.
2 The Model
In this part, we introduce the model of endogenous eﬀort choice by the company workers
as a reaction to the size of the company. We deﬁne the equilibrium, determine how the
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amount of eﬀort responds to the change in the company size N , and obtain comparative
statics results.
Company workers contribute eﬀort for production. The eﬀorts of individual workers
{e1, ..., eN} are transformed into aggregated effort by the effort aggregator function:
g(e1, ..., eN |N) : R
N
+ → R+, (1)
where g(·|N) changes with N . The aggregated eﬀort is then used for production via f(·),
the production function4. Exercising eﬀort lowers the utility of a teammember by the eﬀort
cost c(e). Obviously, the choice of eﬀort depends upon other members’ eﬀort choice.
The team members split the fruits of their eﬀorts equally. The worker’s problem in the
team is therefore to choose eﬀort e to maximize
u(e|e2, ..., eN , N) =
1
N
f (g(e, e2, ..., eN |N))− c(e). (2)
The firm of sizeN , following the literature, acknowledges the strategic complementar-
ities between workers’ eﬀorts, and provides each worker with a contract that makes this
worker implement the ﬁrst best eﬀort level. We assume that the residual claimant collects
all the surplus; results do not change if the residual claimant collects only a ﬁxed propor-
tion of the surplus, with the rest of the surplus going to the government, to employees
as a ﬁxed transfer, or to waste. The eﬀort aggregator and the production function are the
same.
We introduce a number of assumptions in order to obtain useful characterizations.
Assumption 1. f(·) is strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable.
4This does not have to be a production function. If, for instance, g denotes the amount of eﬀort spent,
q(g) delivers the quantity produced from employing g eﬀorts, and P (q) is the inverse demand function,
f(g) ≡ q(g)P (q(g))would be the revenue function, which can easily be not concave. We omit this discussion
for brevity, and continue to call f(·) the production function.
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This is a technical assumption on the production function. We do not require for now
that f(·) has decreasing returns to scale or that it is positive everywhere. We use this
assumption in all characterizations of the behaviour of optimal eﬀort.
Assumption 2. g(·|N) is symmetric in ei, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increas-
ing in each argument, concave in one’s own effort, and homogenous5 of degree 1 with respect to
{e1, ..., eN}. Normalize g(1|1) to 1.
This assumption states that the identities ofworkers donotmatter, and only the amount
of eﬀort does. This assumption is the cornerstone of our analysis, since we are considering
symmetric equilibria.
One of the consequences of this assumption is that g′1(e1, e2, .., eN |N) is homogenous
degree 0. This, in turn, implies that in a symmetric outcome
g′′11(e, e, .., e|N) + g
′′
12(e, e, .., e|N) + ...+ g
′′
1N(e, e, .., e|N) = 0⇔
g′′11(e, e, .., e|N) = −(N − 1)g
′′
1i(e, e, .., e|N) ∀i ∈ {2..N}, (3)
which by the concavity in one’s own eﬀort means that in symmetric outcomes, not neces-
sarily everywhere, the eﬀorts of members are strategic complements.
Assumption 3. c(·) is increasing, convex, twice differentiable, c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
This immediately implies that every team member exerts a positive amount of eﬀort,
since f(g(·)) is assumed to be strictly increasing at zero. Without this assumption, one
would need caveats about what happens when no workers expend any eﬀort.
5Homogeneity of degree of exactly 1 is not a very restrictive assumption: if one has g(·) which is homo-
thetic of degree γ, one can use g˜(·) = g(·)1/γ and f˜(x) = f(xγ). They produce the same composition, but
g˜(·) is homogenous degree 1.
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Example 1. (based on McGinty, 2014) Let g(e1, .., eN |N) =
(∑N
i=1 e
ρ
i
)1/ρ
, f(x) = xα, c(x) is
increasing, twice differentiable and concave, and c′(e)e1−α is increasing6. Therefore, agent 1 solves
max
e1
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
eρi
)α/ρ
− c(e1),
that which, assuming a symmetric outcome, produces e1 = ... = eN = e
∗(N) = z(N
α−2ρ
ρ ), where
z(x) is the inverse of c′(z)z1−α/α. Hence, e∗(N) is increasing in N if and only if ρ ∈ (0, α/2).
The effort aggregator therefore needs to be closer to Cobb-Douglas to have effort increasing in step
with team size.
Even for a well-behaved aggregation function such as CES it is hard to obtain a well-
deﬁned argmaxNe
∗(N), and for othermaximands, it is even harder, for instance, the utility
of a representative agent. This goes against the data: most companies operate with a
limited workforce, whatever the maximand they pursue. In order to understand better
what kind of interaction can deliver nontrivial predictions (neither 1 nor+∞), we need to
characterize the changes in e∗(N). The ﬁrst-order condition of the worker’s problem is
f ′(g(e1, ..., eN)|N))g
′
1(e1, ..., eN |N)/N − c
′(e1) = 0. (4)
Solving the ﬁrst-order condition is suﬃcient to solve for the maximum when
f ′′(g(e1, ..., eN)|N))(g
′
1(e1, ..., eN |N))
2/N+f ′(g(e1, ..., eN)|N))g
′′
11(e1, ..., eN |N)/N−c
′′(e1) < 0
(5)
for every {e2, ..., eN}. Denote εq(x) = q
′(x)x/q(x), the elasticity of q(·) with respect to x.
By dividing the second-order condition by the ﬁrst-order condition andmultiplying by e1,
with a slight abuse of notation one can obtain
εf ′(g(e1, ..., eN |N))εg(e1, ..., eN |N) +
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
εg′1(e1, ..., eN |N)−εc′(e1) < 0, (6)
6Particularly, α ≤ 1 suﬃces. McGinty (2014) takes c(e) = k e
2
2 , and restricts α to less than 2.
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which will hold whenever (5) holds.
Assumption 4. (5) holds for every {e1, ..., eN} for every N .
This assumption guarantees that the ﬁrst-order condition has a unique solution. In-
stead, one can assume that f(·) features decreasing returns to scale, and the aggregator
function g(·) is concave in each argument. Alternatively, one can require that c(·) is con-
vex enough.
2.1 Effort Choice in a Team: Equilibrium Outcome
The equilibrium is a collection of the eﬀorts of agents {e∗1, ..e
∗
N} such that each worker i
solves his problem (2) treating the eﬀorts of the other peers as given:
e∗i = argmaxe
1
N
f
(
g(e, e∗−i|N)
)
− c(e),
where e∗−i denotes the values of {e
∗
1, .., e
∗
N} omitting e
∗
i .
Assumption 5. A unique symmetric equilibrium with nonzero efforts exists.7
Let e∗(N) be the function that solves
f ′(g(e∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N))g′1(e
∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N)/N = c′(e∗(N)). (7)
Homogeneity of degree 1 for g(·) helps us to study the behavior of e∗(N). Deﬁne
h(N) ≡ g(1, .., 1|N).
7We can obtain this assumption as a result by imposing additional assumptions on f(·) and g(·), such as
supermodularity and Inada conditions. The pure strategy equilibrium exists because the game we consider
here is a potential game; see Monderer and Shapley (1996), Dubey et al. (2006) and Jensen (2010). To secure
the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric outcome, one can impose additional assumptions on f ◦g(·),
c(·), direct (concavity) or indirect (proﬁt single-crossing, compactness of strategy space), but such outcomes
are clearly quite common. We opt to avoid the discussion of restrictiveness of these additional assumptions,
and concentrate on the interesting case.
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This function represents the eﬃciency of coworking. Observe that
h(N) =
eg(
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, 1, .., 1 |N)
eg(1|1)
=
g(
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
e, e, e, .., e |N)
g(e|1)
;
that is, h(N) measures how much more eﬃcient is the team of agents that the eﬀorts of
a single person, holding eﬀort level unchanged. Henceforth we will call this the teamwork
efficiency function. For instance, if it is linear, the working team is as eﬃcient as its members
applying the same eﬀort separately. By Euler’s rule and the symmetry of g(·),
h(N) =
d(h(N)e)
de
=
dg(e, e, .., e|N)
de
= g′1(e, .., e)+g
′
2(e, .., e)+..+g
′
N(e, .., e) = Ng1(e, .., e|N).
Therefore, (7) can be rewritten as
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 = c′(e∗(N)). (8)
Equation (8) is the incentive constraint that deﬁnes e∗(N) as a function of N .
2.2 Effort Choice in a Firm: First Best
Following Holmstrom (1982), we assume that the residual claimant provides the employ-
ees with contracts that implement the ﬁrst-best choice of eﬀort.
Assumption 6. The first-best choice of effort is positive and symmetric.8
The residual claimant would choose the eﬀort size eP (N) to implement by maximizing
max
e1,..eN
f(g(e1, e2, .., eN |N))−
N∑
i=1
c(ei),
8This Assumption is a shortcut in a spirit similar to Assumption 5; see Footnote 7.
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which, assuming a symmetric outcome, leads to the ﬁrst-order condition
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N = c′(eP (N)). (9)
The solution of (9), eP (N), is greater than the solution of (8), e∗(N), as long as N > 1.
The reason is that in equilibrium, the marginal payoﬀ for the individual eﬀort does not
take into account the complementarities provided to other workers. Even if the product
f(·) were not split N ways, but instead were non-rivalrous,9 the additional 1/N in the
marginal beneﬁt of the team worker would persist.
2.3 Second-Order Conditions and Uniqueness
Equation (6), the second-order condition of (8), in the equilibrium can be rewritten as
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
1
N
+
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
εg′1(e
∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N)−εc′(e
∗(N)) < 0. (10)
This is because εg(e
∗(N), .., e∗(N)|N) = (h(N)/N)e
∗(N)
e∗(N)h(N)
= 1
N
. Let
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))− εc′(e
∗(N)) < 0 (11)
hold; then (10) is satisﬁed automatically. If c(x) ismore convex than f(y) at every x ≥ y, this
condition is satisﬁed. Similar math is used to compare the risk-aversity of individuals: for
every u(x), εu′(x) is just the negative of Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
The second-order condition for (9) is
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))h2(N)/N − c′′(eP (N)) < 0,
9For non-rivalrous goods, consumption by one agent does not prevent or worsen the consumption of
the same unit of good by another agent. Think of coauthoring a paper: the fact of eventual publication
contributes to both authors asmuch as theywould derive if there was only one author, at least in the opinion
of some promotion committees.
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which, after dividing by the ﬁrst-order condition, can be rewritten as
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N))− εc′(e
P (N)) < 0. (12)
Observe that it is very similar to (11): but the eﬀort level in the argument is diﬀerent.
One would be sure that both (11) and (12) hold if one were sure that c(·) is at every point
“convexer” than f(·) at every point above: εf ′(y) < εc′(x)∀y > x. This can be simpler to
verify if additional assumptions are imposed on εf ′ or εc′ :
Result 1. If either εf ′(x) or εc′(x) is weakly decreasing, εf ′(x) < εc′(x), and h(N) ≥ 1, (11) and
(12) are satisfied.
Second-order conditions hold at maxima automatically, but if they hold everywhere,
the solution of the corresponding FOC has to be unique. Result 1 thus provides suﬃcient
conditions for the uniqueness of the pure strategy outcome.
εf ′(x) being decreasing has the following interpretation. When εf ′(x) is constant and
equal to α, it means that f ′(x) = Kxα, which makes f(x) a power function, whereK is an
integration constant (unless α = −1, in which case f ′(x) = K ln x). The decreasing εf ′(x)
implies the “lower power”, or ”less convexity” of f(·) in larger arguments.
3 The Optimal Size of the Company
For now, h(N) has been deﬁned only for N ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}. Algebraically, the problem of
the optimal ﬁrm size with distinct nonatomary agents lies in the discreteness of the ﬁrm
size, which comes from having an integer quantity of arguments in g(·). However, using
symmetry, homogeneity and the function h(N), we alleviated this mathematical problem.
With a heroic leap of faith, we extend the deﬁnition of h(N) to real positive semi-axis.10
10For g(e1, e2, ..eN |N) =
√
e21 + ..+ e
2
N + α
∑
i =j eiej , α ∈ [0,+∞) yields h(N) =
√
αN2 + (1− α)N ,
with εh(N) = 1 −
1−α
2αN+(1−α) , an increasing function of N when α < 1 and a decreasing function when
α > 1. Many papers impose an ad hoc g(·)without any discussion; Kremer (1993) argues for Cobb-Douglas,
Rajan and Zingales (1998) goes for linear additive; McGinty (2014) uses CES; see Dubey et al. (2006), p. 86
and Jensen (2010), p. 16 for other examples.
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The discussion of how to choose a proper h(N) from knowing g(·) is in Appendix A.1.
With diﬀerentiable h(N), we can take derivatives with respect toN , and expect e∗(N) and
eP (N) deﬁned with (8) and (9) to be continuous and diﬀerentiable.
In order to conduct the comparative statics with respect to N , we apply the usual im-
plicit function apparatus.11 Knowing how the workers of the company of size N choose
their eﬀort, we can characterize the consequences of various company managerial objec-
tives on its hiring policy.
Assumption 7. The Problems we study are single-peaked, that is, there is a unique interior
maximum point; the derivative of every Problem’s Lagrangean is strictly positive below this point,
and strictly negative above this point.
Our results extend to the case when intersections are multiple in a manner similar to
the way that comparative statics with multiple equilibria are treated. We concentrate on
the single-crossing case for brevity: Appendix A.2 elaborates on single-peakedness.
3.1 Team Size that Maximizes Effort
This may be a concern in industries where learning-by-doing is important, and therefore
the decisionmakers would like to increase eﬀorts even though this might hurt their imme-
diate proﬁts. Workers may be willing to participate in teams of a size that maximizes their
eﬀort to combat their long-term/short-term decisionmaking inconsistency issues. This
subsection is crucial to understanding the further analysis. We have therefore sought to
keep the analysis in this part very explicit. Other problems will be dealt with in a similar
fashion, therefore we relocate the repetitive parts to the Appendix.
From (8) one can deduce e∗(N), well-deﬁned and diﬀerentiable over N ∈ R+.
Problem 1. Characterize N1 = argmaxN e
∗(N).
11We can use it because the necessary condition for its use is that the SOC for choosing e(N), which is
either (11) or (12), holds for every N by Assumptions 4 and 5.
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
e∗(N)ր
e∗(N)ց
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
(a) In (εh, εf ′) space
εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
e∗(N)ր
e∗(N)ց
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
(b) Result 2 logic
Figure 1: The choice of N to maximize eﬀort in a team; and the Result 2 logic
Take elasticities with respect to N on both sides of (8) to get:
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) [εe∗(N) + εh(N)] + εh(N)− 2 = εc′(e
∗(N))εe∗(N).
Solve this to obtain
εe∗(N) =
εh(N) (εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1)− 2
εc′(e∗(N))− εf ′(e∗(N)h(N))
. (13)
From (13) one can immediately see that the N that maximizes e∗(N) has to satisfy
εh(N) (εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1) = 2. (14)
The denominator of (13) is positive: it is a second-order condition of the eﬀort choice
problem, (11). Therefore, whenever εh(N) (εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1) > 2, e∗(N) is increasing in
N , and otherwise it is decreasing in N .
In the space of (x, y) = (εh(·), εf ′(·)), Equation (14) simpliﬁes to:
Φ1 = {(x, y)|x (y + 1) = 2.}
Solving out the equilibrium will produce a function e∗(N), and therefore a sequence of
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values of (εh(N), εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)). We depict an example of this path in Figure 1a. Denote
Γ1 = ((εh(N), εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)))|Equation (8) holds).
For the sequence depicted in the Figure 1, one can observe that e∗(N) is increasing at
N ≤ 3, and decreasing forN ≥ 4. Therefore, the optimal “continuous”N (denote itN1) is
between 3 and 4, and the integer N that delivers the maximum eﬀort is either 3 or 4.
The assumption that g(·) is CES makes εh(N) constant; the assumption that f
′(·) is a
power function makes εf ′(·) constant. Example 1 predicts that whether e
∗(N) is increas-
ing or decreasing everywhere depends upon the elasticity of substitution of g(·) precisely
because, in the world of Example 1, f(x) = xα and g(·) is CES. Γ1 is a single point in these
assumptions. Therefore, in order to have a nontrivial prediction about the optimal eﬀort
size, one needs either a decreasing εh(N), or a decreasing ε
′
f (·), or both. Obtaining val-
ues in the general case in inherently complicated, but one can make comparative statics
predictions without knowing the precise speciﬁcation of relevant functions.
Result 2. When εf ′ is decreasing, an increase (decrease) in the marginal costs of effort leads to an
increase (decrease) in N1. When εf ′ is increasing, an increase (decrease) in the marginal costs of
effort leads to a decrease (increase) in N1.
The purpose of this Result is to illustrate that the eﬀort choice comparative statics are
governed by the variation in εf ′ . This illustrates that a simplifying assumption, such as
constant elasticity, for the production function is not innocuous. Even assumptions such
as the concavity of f can restrict the economically important behavior:
Example 2. (based on Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Lemma 2, p. 398) Let g(e1, ..eN |N) =
∑N
i=1 ei,
and let f(x) be concave. Then
εf ′(x) =
f ′′(x)x
f ′(x)
< 0, h(N) = N ⇒ εh(N) = 1,
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and, therefore, for every N , (εh(N), εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))) < (1, 1), no matter what c(·) is. The indi-
vidual effort decreases with N for every N .
3.2 Firm Size that Maximizes Effort
As in the previous part, this problem occurs in industries where learning-by-doing is im-
portant, and long term planningmaymotivate to increase workers’ eﬀort bymanipulating
the number of workers. We assume that when the ﬁrm designs a contract, it tries to im-
plement the ﬁrst-best, which takes into account the agents’ complementarities in g(·). If
the social planner were choosing the eﬀort for the agents, his FOCwould suggest a higher
eﬀort for a givenN (see the discussion of the 1/N eﬀect on p. 12). Since c′(·) is increasing,
this immediately implies that eP (N) ≥ e∗(N), with equality at N = 1, and therefore the
eﬀort-maximizing sizes of a ﬁrm and a team do not have to coincide.
Problem 2. Characterize N2 = argmaxN e
P (N).
The ﬁrst-order condition12 becomes
εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
= 1. (15)
Again, if the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side, the eﬀort is increasing in
N , and the reverse holds when the left-hand side is smaller than 1. The change of the
managerial objective aﬀects multiple components of the optimal size problem:
• The threshold that governs when the ﬁrm is big enough, Φ1, is now replaced by
Ψ1 = {(x, y)|x (y + 1) = 1}.
The reason why 2 in the deﬁnition of Φ1 is replaced by 1 in the deﬁnition of Ψ1 is
exactly because the marginal 1/N eﬀect, which appeared because the individual
12See Appendix for the derivation of solutions for Problems 2-4.
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(a) If e∗(N) were equal to eP (N)
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(b) e∗(N) < eP (N), and εf ′(x) is increasing
Figure 2: Choosing N to maximize eﬀort, the ﬁrm case
marginal beneﬁt did not include the beneﬁts provided to the other participants, went
away.
• Since eP (N) > e∗(N) for almost every level of N , the values of ε′f (e
P (N)h(N)) =
ε′f (e
∗(N)h(N)), unless f(·) is a power function in the relevant domain.
Figure 2b demonstrates the diﬀerence, assuming that ε′f (·) is an increasing function.
Since h(N) did not change, abscissae are the same for diﬀerent values of N for both Φ1
and Ψ1. It is plain that the two eﬀects are at odds: since the threshold is further away,
larger ﬁrms become more eﬃcient. However, the change in εf ′(·) due to higher eﬀorts for
each ﬁrm size might lower the optimal ﬁrm size.
Result 3. If εf ′(x) is weakly increasing, firms that maximize employees’ effort will be larger than
teams that choose their team size to maximize the efforts of the members (N2 > N1).
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 Team Size that Maximizes Utility
Would team members invite more members to join the team? If this increases the utility
of each team member, yes. Thus, the team size that maximizes the utility of a member of
the team is the team size that would emerge if teams were free to invite or expel members.
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
Φ2
ε¯h
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
Note: Below both graphs both eﬀorts and proﬁts increase as the size of the ﬁrm gets larger. Above both graphs both eﬀorts and proﬁts decrease withN . Between graphs, when
εh(N) < ε¯h , eﬀorts increase withN , but proﬁts decrease; the reverse holds when εh(N) > ε¯h .
Figure 3: Choosing N to maximize individual utility
Problem 3. Characterize N3 = argmaxN
1
N
f(h(N)e∗(N))− c(e∗(N)).
N3 should solve the following ﬁrst-order condition:
εf (e
∗(N)h(N))
(
εh(N) +
N − 1
N
εe∗(N)
)
= 1. (16)
Again, at values of N where the left-hand side is larger (smaller) than 1, the utility is
increasing (decreasing) inN . Let Φ2 be the set of locations where (16) holds with equality.
This line, evaluated at N = N1, is plotted over Γ1 and Φ1 on Figure 3.
One can immediately see that:
• There is a unique intersection of Φ1 and Φ2, which happens at ε¯h = 1/εf (e(N1)h(N1)).
• The path of Γ1 intersects Φ1 above Φ1
⋂
Φ2 if and only if N1 < N3. In general, when
two diﬀerent maximands are used, diﬀerent answers are to be expected, but our
result makes issues clearer: the only thing necessary to establish whether N1 < N3
is the value of εh(N1) and of εf (e
∗(N1)h
∗(N1)).
Result 4. If εf ′(e
∗(N1)h(N1)) + 1 < (>) 2εf (e
∗(N1)h(N1)), N3 is larger (smaller) than N1.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Therefore, if the elasticity of f(·) at the size of the team chosen by teammembersN3 is
too small, it is likely that the team will be too large to implement high eﬀorts (N3 > N1).
Observe that the local monotonicity of εf (x) is informative about the comparison be-
tween εf ′(x) + 1 and εf (x):
(εf (x))
′ = (εf ′(x) + 1− εf (x))
εf (x)
x
.
In particular, f(x) > 0 implies (εf (x))
′ > 0⇔ εf ′(x)+1 > εf (x), and the condition in Result
4 means that the elasticity of f(·) is either not decreasing too fast, or that it is decreasing
quite quickly. Since adding and subtracting constants to the production function does not
change εf ′(x), but does change εf (x), both cases (N1 < N3 and N1 > N3) are generic.
In teaching, many lecturers assign home assignments for group work. Some lecturers
use ﬁxed group sizes, other lecturers allow students to form groups of their own choosing.
If higher eﬀort is desirable (for instance, because eﬀort in the classroom is valuable on the
labor market, which is not fully understood by students), it may be a good idea to restrict
the group size, notwithstanding the complaints of students. If the elasticity of f(·) at N1
is greater than 1
2
(εf ′(·) + 1) at the same N1, students will yearn for an increase of the size
of the group, and they will complain that the required group size is too large otherwise.13
Instead of assigning the group sizes, a teacherwhowants to implement teamwork projects
canmanipulate the group’s payoﬀ implied by the project design, tomake sure themaximal
eﬀort group size is close to the maximal utility group size.
3.4 Firm Size that Maximizes Utility
When the principal extracts all surplus from theworkers, maximizing the payoﬀperworker
translates to maximizing proﬁt per worker. The principal maximizes the surplus per
13If one believes that the teachers do not split the payoﬀ equally, but with the rule of 1/β(N) per person
with β(N) > 0, one can instead of 12 in the footnoted sentence use
εβ(N1)
1+εβ(N1)
.
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worker, not the total surplus, because the principal can own more than one ﬁrm, as fast
food franchisers do.
Problem 4. Characterize N4 = argmaxN
1
N
f(h(N)eP (N))− c(eP (N)).
At N4, the following holds (see Appendix for derivation):
εf (e
P (N)h(N))εh(N) = 1 (17)
When εf (e
P (N)h(N))εh(N) > 1, the utility of each member of the ﬁrm increases with the
size of the ﬁrm, and the utility is reduced otherwise.
One can see the diﬀerence between (15) and (17); they have to be equal only when
∀x, εf (x) = εf ′(x) + 1, which implies that f(x) is the power function.
Result 5. If εf (x) is increasing (decreasing), εf ′(x) + 1 > (<) εf (x), and therefore N4 is larger
(smaller) than N2.
Proof. See Appendix.
This Result helps to establish why people do not work eﬃciently in diﬀerent environ-
ments. The problem is not so much in the returns to scale of the production function;
the relevant threshold is the comparison of the ﬁrst and second derivatives of the produc-
tion function, which is known if it is known that the elasticity of the production function
is locally increasing or decreasing. Those employee-owned companies whose employees
feel that they would be more motivated and would work harder had they had more col-
laborators have εf (e
P (N)h(N)) < εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1. The curvature of their production
function is increasing.
Result 6. If εf (x) is decreasing,N4 is smaller thanN3. If εf (x) is increasing, and 2εf (e
∗(N1)h(N1)) <
εf ′(e
∗(N1)h(N1)) + 1, N4 is larger than N3.
Proof. See Appendix.
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This Result shows that the issue of which companies are bigger, teams or ﬁrms, boils
down to the properties of the production function, and the only limitations for the rest of
the fundamentals (such as the cost function and eﬀort aggregation function) is to guar-
antee that assumptions hold. The precise shape of h(·) determines the value of N3 and
N4, but is not always needed to establish which one is bigger. Obviously, there’s plenty
of f(·) whose elasticities are not monotone, but (a) the part that is harder to observe, the
teamwork eﬃciency function, may not require estimation, and (b) themonotonicity is only
important locally, for company sizes near N3 and N4.
Results for other managerial objectives can be obtained in a similar fashion: for in-
stance, a residual claimant that collects a ﬁxed proportion of the total surplus of the ﬁrm
will employ more than N4 workers as long as (12) holds. We reserve these for future re-
search.
3.5 The Quagmire of Constant Elasticities
The previous analysis showed that at least one of two elasticities cannot be constant in
order to obtain a well-deﬁned optimal company size. However, even holding one of two
elasticities constant can mislead. In the following example, we assume that εh(N) is de-
creasing from a large enough value to 0, and the production function is a power function.
Example 3. Let f(x) = xα and c(e) = eβ . Let β > α > 0, then the relevant Assumptions and
(11) are satisfied. For general but convenient h(·), where εh(·) is decreasing, the first-best e
P (N)
chosen by the firm satisfies
α(eP (N)h(N))α−1
h(N)
N
= β(eP (N))β−1 ⇒
eP (N) = exp
[
lnα− ln β
β − α
+
α
β − α
lnh(N)−
1
β − α
lnN
]
.
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Figure 4: Ordering solutions from Example 3
The effort size e∗(N) chosen by the members of the team satisfies
α(e∗(N)h(N))α−1
h(N)
N2
= β(e∗(N))β−1 ⇒
e∗(N) = exp
[
lnα− ln β
β − α
+
α
β − α
lnh(N)−
2
β − α
lnN
]
.
Let us order firm sizes chosen with different managerial objectives. When εh(N) is decreasing,
1. N1, the team size that maximizes the effort when the effort level is chosen simultaneously and
independently, satisfies εh(N1) = 2/α;
2. N2, the firm size that maximizes the effort when the effort level is chosen according to the first
best, satisfies εh(N2) = 1/α;
3. N3, the team size that maximizes the team member’s utility when the effort level is chosen
simultaneously and independently, solves εh(N) =
1
α
+ N−1
Nβ−α
, the right-hand side of which
is monotone and converges to 1
α
+ 1
β
from below.
4. N4, the firm size that maximizes the utility per worker
14 when the effort level is chosen ac-
cording to the first best, satisfies εh(N4) = 1/α;
Example 3 supplies the following intuition for diﬀerent maximands (see Figure 4):
14This coincides with the revenue per worker if the ﬁrst best contract provides 0 utility to the worker.
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1 & 2 The eﬀort-maximizing size of the ﬁrm is greater than the eﬀort-maximizing size of
the team. This is a consequence of f(·) being a power function (see Result 3), and
need not hold in general.
1 & 3 The company size chosen by the team when the decision to hire is in the hands of
the team members is greater than the company size chosen to maximize the eﬀort
size. This is not a general result, but a consequence of a close connection between
εf (·) = α and εf ′(·) = α − 1. Compare (14) and (16): when N is such that (8) is
satisﬁed, (16) suggests that the utility of each participant increases with the size of
the team.
2 & 4 The size of the ﬁrm that maximizes employees’ utilities is maximizing their eﬀort as
well. This is not a general result, but a direct consequence of f(x) = xα: conditions
(15) and (17) coincide algebraically.
3 & 4 When a self-organized team becomes incorporated, it will become larger. This, how-
ever, is not a general result, but a consequence of a power production function.
This exercise demonstrates many spurious ﬁndings arising simply from the desire for
closed form solutions. Some of the strong predictions are generalizable, but most are a
consequence of the power function assumptions.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we stepped away from the common assumptions about production functions
to study the eﬀects of scale on the optimal size of a company, frommany perspectives. We
found ways to circumvent the inherent discontinuity in hiring when complementarities
are important. Our contribution is to characterize the eﬀects of changes in the manage-
ment of the company, such as the incorporation of a partnership, or going from private to
public, on hiring or ﬁring, and whether employees’ eﬀort will suﬀer from overcrowding
or from insuﬃcient specialization. We found that teams do not have to be larger or smaller
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than ﬁrms that use the same production function. The analytic framework that we suggest
is very general, and can bemodiﬁed to include uncertainty, non-trivial ﬁrm ownership (for
instance, oneworker can be the claimant to the residual proﬁt, with nontrivial implications
on the eﬀort choice), non-trivial wage schedules (for instance, imperfect observability of
eﬀort, total or individual, can call for the design of an optimal wage schedule), or proﬁt-
splitting schemes from cooperative game theory, for instance the Shapley value.
The homogeneity of workers is important in our analysis. We have obtained results
for a heterogenous workforce, where some workers are capable (can choose a positive
eﬀort value), and others incapable (those who can only choose zero eﬀort). We can show
that it might be the case that the incapable workers are employed along with the capable
ones: this happens if the eﬀort aggregation function is such that the employment of an
extra person provides teamwork eﬃciency externalities for the capable workers, whereas
additional eﬀort from one hired capable person would diminish the productivity of other
capable employees.
A Proofs
Solution of Problem 1 in text, on page 14.
Solution of Problem 2 To choose the ﬁrm size that maximizes the level of eﬀort, take the
derivative of both sides of
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N = c′(eP (N))
with respect to N . The values of N where (eP (N))′ = 0will be the one we are looking for.
The derivative looks like
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))[h(N)(eP (N))′+h′(N)eP (N)]h(N)/N+f ′(eP (N)h(N))[h′(N)/N−h(N)/N2] =
= c′′(eP (N))(eP (N))′.
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Divide by the ﬁrst-order condition to obtain
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))[h(N)(eP (N))′ + h′(N)eP (N)]h(N)/N + f ′(eP (N)h(N))[h′(N)/N − h(N)/N2]
f ′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)/N
=
=
c′′(eP (N))(eP (N))′
c′(eP (N))
.
Rearrange to obtain
[
c′′(eP (N))eP (N)
c′(eP (N))
−
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))h(N)eP (N)
f ′(eP (N)h(N))
]
(eP (N))′N
eP (N)
=
h′(N)N
h(N)
[
1 +
f ′′(eP (N)h(N))
f ′(eP (N)h(N))
]
−1.
Rewrite:
εeP (N) =
εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
− 1
εc′(eP (N))− εf ′(eP (N)h(N))
.
When εh(N)
(
εf ′(e
P (N)h(N)) + 1
)
> 1, eﬀort increases with the size of team, and eﬀort
decreases otherwise.
Solution of Problem 3 To choose the team size that maximizes utility, solve
max
N
1
N
f (h(N)e∗(N))− c(e∗(N)),
where e∗(N) is such that (8) holds. The ﬁrst-order condition is:
f ′(e∗(N)h(N)) (e∗(N)h′(N) + (e∗(N))′h(N)) /N−f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2−c′(e∗(N))(e∗(N))′ <> 0,
with a > sign when the utility of each team member is increasing with the membership
size, with a < when the utility of each member is decreasing with the membership size,
and with equality at optimum. Substitute (8):
f ′(e∗(N)h(N)) (e∗(N)h′(N) + (e∗(N))′h(N)) /N − f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2 −(
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))h(N)/N2
)
(e∗(N))′ <> 0.
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Group the variables and divide by f(e∗(N)h(N))/N2 > 0 to obtain
f ′(e∗(N)h(N))(e∗(N)h(N))
f(e∗(N)h(N))
(
e∗(N)h′(N)N + (e∗(N))′h(N)(N − 1)
(e∗(N)h(N))
)
− 1 <> 0,
εf (e
∗(N)h(N))
(
εh(N) +
N − 1
N
εe∗(N)
)
− 1 <> 0.
Solution of Problem 4 To maximize the utility of each member of the team when their
eﬀort is imposed to deliver the ﬁrst best outcome, the size of the ﬁrm should be chosen to
solve
max
N
f(eP (N)h(N))
1
N
− c(eP (N)),
subject to (9). The ﬁrst-order condition of this problem is
f ′(f(eP (N)h(N)))[eP (N)h′(N)+h(N)(eP (N))′]
1
N
−
1
N2
f(eP (N)h(N))−c′(eP (N))(eP (N))′ <> 0.
Divide by f(eP (N)h(N))/N2 and rearrange to obtain
1
f(eP (N)h(N))/N2
(
εf (e
P (N)h(N))εh(N)− 1
)
<> 0. (18)
Result 1. If εf ′ is decreasing, then for every level of eﬀort e,
εf ′(eh(N)) ≤ εf ′(e) < εc′(e).
If εc′ is decreasing, then for every level of eﬀort e,
εf ′(eh(N)) < εc′(eh(N)) ≤ εc′(e).
Substituting the relevant eﬀort levels completes the proof.
Lemma 1. Let e˜(N) > e(N). If εf ′(·) is weakly decreasing (increasing), the effort-maximizing
team size under e˜(N) is lower (higher) than the effort maximizing team size for e(N).
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Proof of Lemma 1. Let N1 and N˜1 be solutions to team eﬀort maximizing problems with
eﬀort functions e(N) and e˜(N) respectively. If εf ′(·) is weakly decreasing, since e(N) <
e˜(N)
εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e(N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 ≥ εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e˜(N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 = 0.
Since we assumed that the problem is single-peaked, this implies that the eﬀort is increas-
ing with N for e(N) at N = N˜1, or that N1 > N˜1. The result for increasing εf ′(·) is proven
similarly.
Result 2. Suppose themarginal costs decrease to c˜′(x) ≤ c′(x) for any x. Consider symmet-
ric equilibrium eﬀorts e(N) for the initial problem and c(·) costs, and e˜(N) under modiﬁed
costs c˜(·). By necessary conditions e(N) and e˜(N) solve (7) with marginal cost functions
c′(x) and c˜′(x) respectively. Therefore,
f ′(e(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 − c˜′(e(N)) ≥ 0 = f ′(e˜(N)h(N))h(N)/N2 − c˜′(e˜(N)).
This, combined with second order conditions and single crossing, implies e˜′(N) ≥ e(N).
Applying Lemma 1, we obtain the result.
Result 3. Let N˜1 solve
εh(N˜1)
(
εf ′(e
P (N˜1)h(N˜1)) + 1
)
− 2 = 0.
Then N˜1 ≤ N2 by single-peakedness assumption for Problem 1. Moreover, by Lemma 1,
N˜1 ≥ N1 as e
P (N) ≥ e∗(N) for each N . Hence, N2 ≥ N˜1 ≥ N1.
Result 4. Evaluate (16) at N1:
εf (e
∗(N1)h(N1))εh(N1) <> 1.
28
We know that
(εf ′(e
∗(N1)h(N1)) + 1)εh(N1) = 2.
When 2εf (e
∗(N1)h(N1)) > εf ′(e
∗(N1)h(N1)) + 1,
2εf (e
∗(N1)h(N1))h(N1) > 2⇒ εf (e
∗(N1)h(N1))h(N1) > 1,
meaning by the single-peakedness of Problem 3 that N3 > N1. The proof in the opposite
direction is identical.
Result 5. εf (x) ≥ εf ′(x) + 1means
εf (e
P (N2)h(N2))εh(N)− 1 ≥ (εf ′(e
P (N2)h(N2)) + 1)εh(N)− 1 = 0
Workers’ utility increases at N2; hence, by the single-peakedness of Problem 4, N2 ≤ N4.
The proof in the opposite direction is identical.
Result 6. N3 is governed by Equation (16), N4 is governed by Equation (17).
If εf (·) is decreasing, εf (e
∗(N)h(N)) > εf (e
P (N)h(N)) for every N , and therefore the
path in the space (εf (), εh()) for e
∗() is above the path for eP (); see Figure 5b for illustration.
The intersection of the solid path, that is the outcomeof the ﬁrst-best eﬀort choice outcome,
with the εf (·)εh = 1 locus provides N4. The intersection of the dashed path, that is the
outcome of the team-member eﬀort choice, with εf (·)εh = 1 locus would provide N3 if N1
were equal to N3: then εe∗ would be equal to zero. In this case, we would argue, N4 < N3:
if the intersection happened for the dashed path, the solid path has already intersected the
solid threshold, because it is below the dashed line. However, because εf (·) is decreasing,
εf (·) > εf ′(·) + 1, and by Result 4, N3 happens before the dashed path intersects with
εf (·)εh = 1 locus. Therefore, N3 < N4.
If εf (·) is increasing, εf (e
∗(N)h(N)) < εf (e
P (N)h(N)) for every N , and therefore the
path in the space (εf (), εh()) for e
∗() is below the path for eP (); see Figure 5a for illustration.
The intersection of the solid path, that is the outcomeof the ﬁrst-best eﬀort choice outcome,
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εf (·)
εfεh = 1
(εh(N), εf (e
P (N)h(N)))
(εh(N), εf (e
∗(N)h(N)))
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N4
N3
(a) When εf () is increasing
εh(N)
εf (·)
εfεh = 1
(εh(N), εf (e
P (N)h(N)))
(εh(N), εf (e
∗(N)h(N)))
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N3
N4
(b) When εf () is decreasing
Figure 5: Result 6 logic
with the εf (·)εh = 1 locus provides N4. The intersection of the dashed path, that is the
outcome of the team-member eﬀort choice, with εf (·)εh = 1 locus would provide N3 if N1
were equal to N3: then εe∗ would be equal to zero. In this case, we would argue, N4 > N3:
if the intersection happened for the dashed line, the solid line cannot yet intersect with
the threshold, because it’s above the dashed line. However, because of Result 4, we know
that N1 is smaller than N3 when 2εf (e
∗(N1)h(N1)) < εf ′(e
∗(N1)h(N1)) + 1, and by single-
peakedness of Problem 1, this means that at the intersection of the dashed path and the
threshold, εe∗ is negative. Therefore, N3 is a point before the threshold, further ensuring
that N4 > N3.
A.1 The Choice of h′(·)
If one knows f(·), h(·), and c(·), one can conduct the analysis above. However, h′(N) is
not a fundamental, at least not in non-integer values. It suﬃces to know h(N) to evaluate
e∗, eP , εf , εf ′ and εc at integerNs. The optimum characterizations, however, depend upon
h′(N) as well. h′(N) values at integer points would suﬃce, since optimization requires
checking whether the value of the elasticity of h(·) is above or below a certain threshold.
How can one choose the value of h′(N) at integer points if one knows only h(N) at integer
points? Obviously, arbitrary choices of h′(N) can position the points everywhere in the
space of (εh, εf ′). One can impose a reﬁnement over the possible derivatives of h(N), such
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εh(N)
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
Φ1
Φ2
ε¯h
N = 1
N = 2
N = 3
N = 4
N = 5
Note: The solid lines represent the possible values for the path Γ1 at integerNs under the restriction of (19). Shaded region represent possible places for the path of Γ1 over
non-integer values ofN . Arrows follow a sample path.
Figure 6: Applying restriction (19) to characterizeN1when continuous h(·) is not available.
as:
h′(N) ∈ [min(h(N + 1)− h(N), h(N)− h(N − 1)),max(h(N + 1)− h(N), h(N)− h(N − 1))] .
(19)
To connect integer points, assume that between two neighboring integers, h′(N) is mono-
tone. This implies that the extrema of h(N) are found only at integer points. Obviously,
this preserves concavity, convexity and monotonicity, if h(N) deﬁned over integers had
had these properties. This limitation greatly helps to characterize the optimal paths. Con-
sider Figure 6, which is similar to Figure 3, but instead of points along the path of Γ1, we
plot sets for every value of εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) that is consistent with some value of h′(N) re-
stricted by (19) at integer values, and then impose monotonicity for h(·) across the path to
connect the integer values. On Figure 6, one can see that the intersection with Φ1 happens
betweenN = 3 andN = 4, whereas for theΦ2 intersectionwith Γ1 is found betweenN = 4
and N = 5. Therefore, for f(·) and g(·) behind Figure 6, the self-organizing team will be
too large to maximize eﬀorts.
The reverse problem of obtaining g(·) if one knows h(·) but not g(·) is surprisingly easy.
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Result 7. For every h(N),
g(e1, .., eN |N) = h(N) (e1e2...eN)
1/N and g(e1, .., eN |N) = h(N)/N
1/ρ
(
N∑
i=1
eρi
)1/ρ
for ρ < 1 have properties necessary to apply the analysis above.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that, for g(e1, ..eN) = h(N)(e1e2...eN)
1/N , one obtains
g(1, 1, .., 1|N) = h(N)(1× 1× 1× ..× 1)1/N = h(N),
and homogeneity degree 1 is trivial. Since the function is Cobb-Douglas conditional on
N , g′i(·|N) =
1
N
g(·|N)
ei
> 0 and g′′ii = −
N−1
N2
g(·|N)
e2i
< 0, therefore, Assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
The CES case is proven similarly.
This result emphasizes the comparative importance of h(N) over the complementari-
ties in g(·): many diﬀerent families of g(·) functions can supply mathematically identical
h(N) functions. g(·) should provide enough complementarity for the eﬀort choice prob-
lem to have a unique solution. The marginal eﬀects of eﬀort complementarity are less
important than the scale eﬀects of teamwork for the question of eﬃcient ﬁrm size. This,
of course, is a consequence of the homogeneity of g(·).
A.2 When Our Problems are Single Peaked
In general, the solutions of our Problems characterize two areas in the space of two elas-
ticities: one where the maximand is increasing with company size, and another where the
maximand is decreasing with company size. Consider Problem 1. For single-peakedness,
we need the path of elasticity values (such as the one depicted with arrows in Figure 1)
for our speciﬁc Problem to cross the boundary once. Therefore, the path must start from
above the boundary, and should end below the boundary.
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Moreover, the path should intersect the boundary at most once. Guaranteeing this is
hard: since eﬀort might be decreasing in N , the elasticity of f or of f ′ might reverse the
direction, as soon as the boundary was crossed.
Result 8. Problem 1 is single-peaked if
• εh(N) > 2,
• εh(N) is weakly decreasing, and εf ′(x) is weakly decreasing,
• εh(1)(εf ′(e
∗(1)) + 1) ≥ 2,
• and the limit points of εh(N)(εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N)) + 1) as N → +∞ are less than 2.
Proof. The last two conditions are to guarantee that teams of size inﬁnity and teams of size
of less than 1 are not optimal. The second condition makes sure that the path of elasticity
values can cross the boundary only from above. Finally, the ﬁrst condition makes sure
that e(N)h(N) is an increasing function:
Diﬀerentiate f ′(e∗(N)h(N))
h(N)
N2
= c′(e∗(N)) wrt to N ⇒
f ′′(e∗(N)h(N))
h(N)
N2
de∗(N)h(N)
dN
+ f ′(e∗(N)h(N))
(
h′(N)
N2
− 2
h(N)
N3
)
=
= c′′(e∗(N))
de∗(N)
dN
=
c′′(e∗(N))
h(N)
de∗(N)h(N)
dN
− c′′(e∗(N))
h′(N)
h(N)
e∗(N).
Divide by the FOC:
εf ′(e
∗(N)h(N))
e∗(N)h(N)
de∗(N)h(N)
dN
+
(
h′(N)
h(N)
−
2
N
)
=
εc′(e
∗(N)h(N))
e∗(N)h(N)
de∗(N)h(N)
dN
−εc′(e
∗(N)h(N))
h′(N)
h(N)
.
de∗(N)h(N)
dN
N
e∗(N)h(N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
εe∗h
=
εh(N)(1 +Nεc′(e
∗(N)))− 2
εc′(e∗(N)h(N))− εf ′(e∗(N)h(N))
.
For CES eﬀort aggregation function, g(e1, e2, .., eN) = (e
ρ
1 + e
ρ
2 + ...+ e
ρ
N)
1/ρ, h(N) =
N1/ρ, and εh(N) =
1
ρ
, so this condition mean that ρmust be in (0, 1
2
].
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Similarly,
deP (N)h(N)
dN
N
eP (N)h(N)
=
εh(N)(1 +Nεc′(e
P (N)))− 1
εc′(eP (N)h(N))− εf ′(eP (N)h(N))
.
Therefore, for the single-peakedness of Problem2, one can impose similar conditions, with
the only diﬀerence that εh(N) > 1, which is a weaker requirement, would suﬃce instead;
we omit the derivation and the formal statement for brevity.
The diﬀerence between the boundaries of Problem 2 and Problem 4 is that εf (·), not
εf ′(·), should be decreasing, so conditions 2–4 change. There are obviously plenty of
functions that have decreasing elasticities of both f(x) and f ′(x), for example, f(x) =
−Ax2 + Bx + C with A > C > 0 and B > 0 when x ∈ [0, B
2A
], that is, when f(x) is
increasing. In any case, one can supply the suﬃcient conditions for the single-peakedness
of Problem 4 in the spirit of Result 8 by modifying the ﬁrst condition.
The single-peakedness of Problem 3 is harder to obtain, because it involves εe∗ . Aswith
the approach about Problem 4, we can impose an assumption about εf (·) being decreas-
ing. However, it is harder to show that the boundary (16), which should be intersected, is
decreasing: the equation is not deﬁned in the space of two elasticities. Even if one were
sure that εe∗(N) is decreasing as a function of N , one could not be sure that Problem 3 is
single-peaked: the weight attached to elasticities changes withN . Explicit derivation will
yield such objects as εf ′′′ and εc′′′ , which have no well-established intuition.
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